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BAR BRIEFS
legislature might have, had it desired, omitted any provision for notice of
the expiration of the time of redemption, since that was not a constitutional
requirement under due process, and it is uniformly held that the legislature
has power by a subsequent statute to cure irregularities in tax proceedings,
the necessity of which might have been dispensed with or declared im-
material by prior statute. Saranac Land and Timber Co. v. Roberts, 177 U.
S. 318, 20 S. Ct. 642, 44 L. Ed. 786 (1900); Shattuck v. Smith, 6 N. D. 56,
69 N.W. 5 (1896); Never v. Cornwall, 10 N. D. 123, 86 N.W. 227 (1901);
Wells Co. v. McHenry, 7 N. D. 256, 74 N.W. 241 (1898). From what has
been stated above, it seems that the defect attacked in the case under dis-
cussion was not a jurisdictional one, since if the legislature may dispense
with the notice of expiration of the period of redemption entirely, then under
the test laid down in Nind v. Meyers, 15 N. D. 400, 109 N.W. 335 (1906), it
would seem that an error in the notice of expiration of the period of redemp-
tion would not be such a jurisdictional defect as is normally necessary to
cause the limitation statute to be inoperative. However, in two compara-
tively recent cases, Fish v. France, 71 N. D. 499, 2 N. W. 2d 537 (1942) and
Hodges v. McCutcheon, 72 N. D. 150, 5 N.W. 2d 83 (1942), which are very
similar to the case under discussion here, except that the notice of expira-
tion of the period of redemption included taxes prior to the taxes for which
the property was sold at the tax sale, instead of subsequent as in the present
case, the court held that such a defect would not start the statute running.
Upon petition for rehearing the court in the McCutcheon Case expressly
stated that such a defect which vitiates the notice of expiration of redemp-
tion is a jurisdictional defect, and thus left no doubt as to the law in this
state.
RAY R. FRIEDERICH
Second Year Law Student
TORTS-BREACH OF STATUTORY DUTY-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS
DEFENSE. Plaintiff's husband died of burns received from explosion of
gasoline and kerosene mixture sold in violation of a statute enacted for the
protection of the public and describing certain precautions to be used in
handling and labeling volatile oils distilled from petroleum. In an action
by plaintiff for damages for death, the trial court directed a verdict for
the defendant oil company. On appeal to the supreme court it was held,
that the judgment be reversed and a new trial granted. Contributory neg-
ligence is available as a defense even though defendant violated a statute.
Plaintiff is entitled to new trial of issues raised in view of courts state-
ment of the law on this point. Dart v. Pure Oil Co., 27 N.W. 2d 555 (Minn.
1947).
Broadly speaking, whether contributory negligence is a defense to a
statutory tort depends upon the intent of the legislature in enacting the
statute; those statutes not permitting the defense are based either upon the
principle that certain classes of people are protected because of their in-
ability to protect themselves, Restatement Torts, § 483 (1934), or upon
other grounds of public policy. In the first classification are included child
labor acts, Dusha v. Virginia & Rainy Lake Co., 145 Minn. 171, 176 N.W.
482, 23 A.L.R. 632 (1920); statutes protecting intoxicated persons, Mayes
v. Byers, 214 Minn. 54, 7 N.W. 2d 403, 144 A.L.R. 821 (1943); Hauth v.
Sambo, 100 Neb. 160, 158 N.W. 1036 (1916) ; and statutes forbidding sale of
dangerous articles to minors, Pizzo v. Wiemann, 149 Wis. 235, 134 N.W.
899, 38 A.L.R. (N.S.) 678, Ann. Cas. 1913C 803 (1912). Those instances
forbidding the defense upon other grounds of public policy include willful
violation of safety statutes for protection of employees, Western Anthracite
Coal and Coke Co. v. Beaver, 192 Ill. 333, 61 N.E. 335 (1901); Chicago-
Joulterville Coal Co. v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York, 130 F. 957
(C.C.W.D. Mo. 1904) ; absolute liability of railroads for fires set by its loco-
motives, Mathews v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 142 Mo. 645, 44 S.W. 802
(1897) ; absolute liability of railroads for failure to build fences or erect
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cattle guards, Chapin v. Ann Arbor Railroad Co., 167 Mich. 648, 133 N.W.
512 (1911) ; and workmen's compensation statutes which specifically elim-
inate the defense. At least one case states that, if defendant's violation
of a statute imposing both civil and criminal liability amounts to "gross"
negligence, contributory negligence is not a defense. See Ludke v. Burck,
160 Wis. 440, 152 N.W. 190, 192, L.R.A. 1915D 969, 38 A.L.R. 1425 (1915) ;
Cf. Pinoza v. Northern Chair Co., 152 Wis. 473, 140 N.W. 84 (1913). But it
follows that such would be the case only in those few jurisdictions, Prosser,
Torts, p. 257 (1941), recognizing degrees of negligence. However, the
usually followed canon is that statutes in derogation of the common law are
to be strictly construed, and that the intention to exclude the defense of
contributory negligence must, therefore, be clearly shown. Globe & Rutgers
Fire Ins. Co. v. Draper, 66 F. 2d 985 (C.C.A. 9th 1933). Where a certain act
or omission is declared illegal by a statute which is silent as to a civil remedy
for its violation, all courts seem to hold that, in the absence of defendant's
gross negligence or willful injuring, contributory negligence is a defense.
Browne v. Siegel, Cooper & Co., 191 Ill. 226, 60 N.E. 815 (1901) ; Thorton v.
Cleveland, C.C., & St. L. Ry. Co., 131 Ind. 492, 31 N.E. 185 (1892) ; Notes, 9
L.R.A. (N.S.) 338 (1907), L.R.A. 1915E 500, 5 L.R.A. (N.S.) 186 (1907).
The courts are split where the statute, silent as to the effect of contributory
negligence, provides that the violator of the duy imposed by it shall be
answerable in damages for any injury caused thereby. It is a question of
statutory construction, and most cases hold that contributory negligence is
a defense. Sehutt v. Adair, 99 Minn. 7, 108 N.W. 811 (1906); Morrison v.
Lee, 22 N. D. 251, 133 N.W. 548, 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 412 (1911).
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